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Summary: When the first phase of the crisis focused primarily on the interbank market volatility, the 
second phase spread on the instability of public finance. Although the overall stance of public finances 
of the new members is better than the old member countries, the differences within the new group are 
significant (from the performer Estonia to the laggard Hungary). Sovereign CDS spreads have become 
major variables focused on risks and expectations about the fiscal situation of different countries. In 
the paper we investigate, first, whether there is a link in the new member states (NMS) between the 
expectations about the condition of their public finances and the dynamics of money markets, 
including integration of national money markets with the euro area. In others word we contribute to 
clarify the relationship between fiscal and liquidity risks as major components of systemic risk. 
Second, we look on the particularities of this relationship through the different phases of the crisis and 
across the different countries using different monetary regimes. This concerns mostly two opposite 
extreme monetary regimes, namely, currency boards (and quasi-fixed exchange rate) - Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or inflation targeting - Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. 
The results obtained form the high frequency panel data models support the theoretical hypotheses and 
policy intuition that exists strong relationship between the liquidity risk (measured by the short term 
money markets) and fiscal risk (measured by CDS) and that this link is extremely unstable and in 
some sense nonlinear during the financial crisis. Our study confirm that the strong link between 
monetary and public finance risk as apart of total systemic risk increase during the crisis especially for 
currency boards regimes, when the link becomes stronger and pronounced. For the inflation targeting 
countries the link became weaker and less pronounced.  
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Introduction  
 
The crisis placed again in the center of attention on the EU stability and expansion of 
the euro area, on monetary and fiscal integration of new countries and their resistance to 
various types of shocks.  
In the few years before the onset of the crisis, the EU enlargement moved without 
significant disruptions and according to the institutional frameworks needed for the next step 
- the enlargement of the euro zone. The main theoretical discussion was limited generally to 
the question of how different types of monetary and exchange rates regimes are able to fulfill 
criteria for nominal and real convergence and to protect against asymmetric shocks. As a rule, 
the monetary policies of the NMS closely followed the ECB policy, either in the discretionary 
regime (inflation targeting), or passively (currency boards or quasi fixed exchange rate). The 
convergence of monetary variables, particularly interest rates was relatively well developed, 
and generally satisfactory nominal integration was observed. This concerned especially the 
interbank money market, which is not only a key element in the transmission of monetary 
policy, but also serves as an indicator for the liquidity stance, for interbank risk and for 
overall confidence in the banking system.  
Current crisis that started during the 2007 has gone through two phases, which are 
reflected on the NMS, especially after September 2008 (Gardo and Martin, 2010). When the 
first phase of the crisis focused primarily on the interbank market volatility, the second phase 
spread on the instability of public finance. Although the overall stance of public finances of 
the new members is better than the old member countries, the differences within the new 
group are significant (from the performer Estonia to the laggard Hungary). In this second 
phase, of sovereign CDS spreads have become a major variable for observation, focused on 
risks and expectations about the fiscal situation of different countries.  
Several interesting theoretical and practical issues appear. First one is, whether there is 
a link in the NMS between expectations about the condition of the public finances and the 
dynamics of money markets, including integration of their money markets with the euro area. 
This mean investigating the links between fiscal and liquidity risks as major components of 
systemic risk, or, which is another manifestation of the above - a correlation between the 
macro (public), and micro (bank) dimensions of the systemic risk. Second, how the above 
link, if exists and a priori it should exist, will be developed in time and in different phases of a 
crisis and how it evolves according to different countries monetary regimes. This concerns 
mostly two opposite extreme monetary regimes, namely, currency boards (and quasi-fixed 
exchange rate) - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, or inflation targeting - Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. Thus, our study is comparative in nature and allows 
opposing various monetary and exchanging rate regimes2. 
After exposing our theoretical motivations and objectives (part 1), and briefly 
presenting the related studies and empirical strategies (part 2), we discussed the results form 
the daily data panels models and we stress some limitations and possible developments of our 
study. 
 
 
Theoretical motivation: integration of money markets and fiscal risks  
 
In the current global and European crisis several phases emerged, two of them are of 
particular importance. The first one is money market crisis when confidence between banks 
                                                 
2 For details see review articles of Ball (2010) and Frankel (2010), and for Eastern Europe see Gardo and Martin 
(2010). 
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ultimately led to deep changes in the principles and techniques of central bank monetary 
policies (quantitative easing, non-standard measures, abandonment of the so called separation 
principle etc...). The second phase concerns the crisis of public finances and public debt, 
which appears later and was largely cumulative result of massive fiscal stimulus taken at the 
outset and designed to help the banking sector and to compensate for the ineffectiveness of 
monetary measures3.  
In the first phase the attention of investors, bankers, and businesses interested in 
European economy was nailed on the state of money market, although a theoretical 
perspective, such markets have been in same respects forgotten and unexplored (Holthausen 
and Pill (2010)4. After a long period of convergence and stability these markets started to 
experience sharp fluctuations (mainly increases) and pronounced divergence of national 
interest rates dynamics5. Short-term interest rates (unsecured overnight interest rates, and 3 
months rates) were of particular importance because they reflect not only changes in short-
term liquidity of the banking sector, but also confidence in the banking system as a whole. 
Shorts term interest rates are closely related to the formation of a term structure of the yield 
curve, indicator of current and anticipated economic development, and they represented a 
major signal for future interventions by central banks. On the charts 1 and 2 are presented the 
respectively the overnight interest rates dynamics and 3 month money market rate dynamics, 
compared to the ECB credit and deposit facilities interest rates. 
 
 
 
Chart 1 Dynamics of overnight interest rates in New Member States  
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3 See details for Ecofin (2009), BNB (2010), ECB, (2010), Berglof and al. (2009), Gardo and Martin (2010), 
Cerisier (2010), Bordes and Clerc (2010). 
4 According to Di Fiore and Tristani (2010, p. 10): "Some of the links between financial markets and the 
macroeconomy remain imperfectly understood, notably the link between interbank markets and aggregate 
economic dynamics". 
5 Key turning points were in August 2007 and September 2008, when they were coordinated and sharply 
reduced key interest rates of leading central banks to arrive in June 2009 when the ECB injected a huge amount 
of 442 billion euros. 
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Chart 2 Dynamics of 3 months interest rates in new member states  
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As to the second phase of the crisis, the attention of investors, bankers and politicians 
was focused on different indicators for fiscal risks (default, payment arrears on sovereign 
bonds, etc.), including spreads of CDS6 which highs reached in March 2009 and mid-April 
2010 (see chart 3). When the interest spreads in the interbank market, showing the state of 
confidence in the banking system and micro-level risks, CDS is indicator for the confidence 
into the sustainability of fiscal and debt policy, i.e. macro-risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The market for CDS (credit default swap) as part of the market in credit derivatives has grown particularly 
rapidly in the last decade, resulting in standardized and certain technical innovations which continue today, see 
for details (Packer and Suthiphongcahi, 2003; ICE , 2010). 
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Chart 3 Dynamics of the CDS to the new member states 
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There is no doubt that different links exit between the state of confidence in the 
interbank market and confidence in public finances as integral parts of systemic risk and 
financial stability (chart 4).  
 
Chart 4 Money market risk and public finance risk as a part of the systemic risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the impact of fiscal risks on the money market going through changes in bank 
balance sheets where sovereign securities are presented. Any worsening of expectations for a 
moratorium or debt restructurings automatically reflected on the state of the banking system, 
the CDS of individual banks is rising, and hence on the price of money market.  
Second, opposite influence exists, from money market interest rates to fiscal 
imbalances, and is expressed primarily in the fact that the government is the guaranty of the 
stability of the banking sector, evidenced by a series of measures of bank capitalization and 
restructuring. Thus, any disturbance of the money market and more expensive resources, 
leads to accumulation of costs for the budget and ultimately worsen the solvency of 
governments.  
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In the NMS, the links already mentioned are interwoven theoretical and practical 
problems associated with the dynamics of convergence and comparative effectiveness of 
different monetary regimes.  
First, as mentioned in the introduction, before the crisis the main issue for the 
comparative analysis concerned the choice of monetary and currency exchange regimes for 
achieving monetary and real convergence. Monetary convergence, i.e. similar movement of 
interest rates with that in the euro area members was considered and is considered the 
minimum requirement for a successful adoption of the common monetary policy. In this 
sense, the interest rate channel and inter-bank interest rates are leading link in the chain of 
transmission mechanism. Crisis change things or at least put them in new conditions. It not 
only cast doubt on the sustainability of the trend towards monetary integration in the NMS, 
but also gave impetus to the destruction of the monolithic behavior of the new countries, 
allowing identifying different individual trajectories, depending on the state of public finance, 
banking systems, and overall structural reforms. Roughly crisis gave a new opportunity for 
expression of the diversity of transition, which has long been subject to thorough analysis and 
numerous publications7.  
Second, the dynamics of monetary convergence especially that of the interbank market, 
considered within the broader discussion on optimality of the European currency zone, and 
allows the benchmarking of monetary regimes performance in the NMS. This concern  the 
current state of the almost bipolar choice of monetary regimes, on the one side Currency 
boards and quasi-fixed rates in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and on the other side 
inflation targeting and floating rates in the Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania8. The 
bipolar situation provides opportunities for almost a natural experiment for the success of the 
two different monetary systems9. In fact this polarity was reached through a long evolution, in 
which stood out different trends and groupings (Nenovsky, 2009).  
Third, disputes between supporters of the CBA and inflation targeting in post-
communist countries have a long history, which acquires real practical terms. It is generally 
believed that Currency boards give greater opportunities for rapid monetary integration, 
because the interest rates passively follow the euro area, due to the effects of credibility and 
discipline10. Credibility and discipline effects provide an opportunity for a tight fiscal policy 
and low public debt11. For its part, proponents of inflation targeting indicate that this 
arrangement allows for greater autonomy and monetary response to asymmetric shocks, and 
that the Currency boards are highly vulnerable. According to them, the effects of credibility 
and discipline are not weaker under the regime of monetary discretion than under the rigid 
monetary rule. Experience shows, however, that the state of the MNS and certain 
preconditions for the integration of the euro area, the opportunities for independent monetary 
policy are small and almost insignificant. This is confirmed by the behavior of interest rates 
before the start of the crisis, which had similar convergence dynamics. 
                                                 
7 See Kornai (2000), Aslund (2002), Colombatto (2002), Winiecki (2004), Csaba (2007), Bohle and Greskovits 
(2007), Havrylyshin (2009) and others. 
8 Slovakia and Slovenia are not subject to analysis; they are full members of the eurozone.  
9 See e.g. the discussion about the comparative success of different countries in combating the crisis made in 
Aslund (2009) and Gardo and Martin (2010). Aslund said the main reason for the crisis is the course currency 
regime and the crisis is particularly serious where the scheme is rigid (Currency boards) and relatively mild pass 
to inflation targeting. Although Aslund’s theoretical considerations are interesting, the facts, however, do not 
confirm his claim, even opposite. Telling evidence is the comparative situation of Estonia and Hungary, 
considered the first member of the eurozone by 2011, and the second - the boundaries of financial collapse. 
10 See for the functioning of currency boards Gulde ()  Nenovsky and Hristov (2002), Nenovsky, Hristov and 
Mihaylov (2002). For the inflation targeting experience in Eastern Europe see (). 
11 Although in general practice confirms these relationships, in reality situation with currency boards are more 
complex and the trajectories of the two effects (credibility and discipline) are complex and nonlinear dynamics 
(Raybaut and Torre, 2005). 
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Related studies and empirical models  
 
For the purposes of empirical measurement general theoretical relationship between 
bank and fiscal risks is limited to an analysis of the relationship between short-term interest 
rates on money market (overnight interest rates and three-month interest rates) and spreads on 
sovereign CDS premiums in different phases of the crisis, as well as two main monetary 
regime. Countries are examined in two groups of countries, four fixed-rate and four with 
inflation targeting. The first group included, the Baltic countries at the beginning of 90 years 
chose a fixed exchange rate regimes (Estonia, 1992, Latvia 1993, Lithuania, 1994) associated 
with geo-strategic choice for separation from the Soviet zone and monetary integration in 
Europe system. They add Bulgaria, which in 1997 introduced a currency board. The second 
group of countries is that inflation targeting selected. Here are the countries of Central Europe 
(Czech Republic, 1998, Poland, 2000, Hungary, 2001) and Romania (2005).  
Several studies may be useful for our analysis, although most of them did not deal with 
or directly tested our dependencies. The dynamics of the whole multitude of interest rates in 
new member states has been studied thoroughly and in detail by Egert and al. (2007) in 
connection with problems of interest rate pass through in 5 countries of Central Europe, and 
Cuaresma and Wojcik (2006) to measure the monetary independence of Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, in different periods of exchange rate regimes (1993- 2003). Using DCC-
MGARCH modeling of the second study the authors found confirmation of the hypothesis of 
greater independence at a floating rate and more in fixed. At the same bed and same parties is 
the study of Habib (2002), which concentrate on short-term interest rates, and finds a lack of 
dependence of interest rates in Germany.  
As for NMS sovereign CDS spreads lack independent studies of their dynamics. 
Indeed, the attention of researchers on the behavior of the CDS spreads is recent, and 
directions for future research are numerous. Several authors establish empirically that these 
spreads reflect quite well the state of fiscal risks and in a sense give more and better 
information than sovereign ratings (Shino and Takahashi, 2010). These authors suggest that 
the relationship between CDS spreads and public debt was especially shown for the countries 
of Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy). For its part Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010) examined the response of the CDS spreads in emerging markets in terms of changes in 
ratings during 2001-2008 and found that positive changes in ratings have a stronger effect on 
CDS that negative changes. An interesting empirical analysis of shocks on the return on bank 
assets of major U.S. and European banks caused by the bank CDS indices is represented in 
Calice and Ioannidis (2009). 
 As for modeling of overnight interest rates, it has a long tradition (Hamilton, 1996; 
Hamilton and Jorda, 2002) and is subject to numerous and interesting attempts to account a 
number of institutional and organizational factors in the EU money market (Nautz and 
Offermanns, 2006; Bartolini and Prati, 2006; Cassola and Mmorana, 2008; Linzert and 
Schmidt, 2008), and the effects of the crisis Holthausen and Pill (2010). Modeling of 
overnight interest rates under a Currency board, in the case of Bulgaria was made by 
Nenovsky and Chobanov (2004).  
The main novelty of the present study is to investigate the direct link between monetary 
and liquidity risk from one side and fiscal and country risk from others side. Our empirical 
strategy is to run the panel models, linking overnight interest rate and sovereign CDS spreads 
of new member states (taken either as level, or deviation from European level). The original 
database we use includes daily observations for short-term interest rates and sovereign CDS 
rates for the period January, 2006, to June 2010, eighth countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania) for Eonia (Euro Overnight Index 
Average) and 3-month Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), and sovereign CDS for 
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Germany. We run the panel firstly for the entire period, and later we split the period into two 
parts, prior to the crisis, and during the crisis. 
The first group of model (equation 1 and 2 below) present the equations of the panel 
model, where NMS interest rates taken as deviation from to EU benchmark: 
 
(1) ittitititititiittit ssdiidiidioiod εαααα +−+−+−+=− *)(*)33(*)(*)( 321  
 
(2) ittitititiittit ssdiidioiod εααα +−+−+=− *)(*)33(*)( 32  
 
In (1) and (2) io denotes overnight interest rates in the new members sates and io* - 
denotes Eonia, i3 presents short 3 months rates, i3* presents 3-month Euribor, i and i* 
presents the policy rates and finally s and s* denote respectively sovereign CDS spreads to 
new countries and those of Germany. The subscript i is for country effect, and t – for the time 
effect. The model (1) was used for countries with inflation targeting regime where the policy 
rate is discretionary formulated. In the case of Currency boards countries (and fixers, like 
Latvia), there is not discretionary policy rate, and where this rate is announced it is of purely 
administrative, statistical and judiciary objectives, therefore the equation (1) becomes (2). 
The second group deals with the same relation between fiscal and liquidity risk, and the 
variables are taken independently (not as a spread) and the EU short term rates appear as 
explanatory variables. In this case we run the following two panels, (3) for inflation targeters 
and (4) for currency boards countries: 
 
(3) ititiitiitiitit idiodsdididiod εαααααα ++++++= *)3(*)()()3()()( 54321  
 
(4) ititiitiitit idiodsdidiod εααααα +++++= *)3(*)()()3()( 5432  
 
 
The results obtained are presented in the tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1 Models in spreads (equations 1 and 2) 
 
 Entire period  
06/2006:05/2010 
 
Prior to the crisis 
06/2006:09/2008 
Crisis period  
10/2008:05/2010 
Fixed exchange rate  
(Bulgaria, Estonia,  
Lithuania, Latvia) 
α=-0.0017 (-0.25) 
 
α2 =1.563 (26.84)* 
α3 =0.0016 (2.72)* 
 
R2= 0.1396 
DW= 1.7792 
Obs 4580 
α=-0.0001 (-0.024) 
 
α2 =0.6930 (9.46)* 
α3 =0.00007 (0.05) 
 
R2= 0.0306 
DW= 1.8792 
Obs 2844 
α=-0.002 (-0.16) 
 
α2 =1.8583 (19.79)* 
α3 =0.0014 (1.76)*** 
 
R2=0.1890 
DW=1.7324 
Obs 1736 
Inflation targeting 
(Poland, Hungary,  
Czech Republic,  
Romania) 
α=0.0007 (0.06) 
α1 =0.5512 (3.89)* 
α2 =0.5517 (10.19)* 
α3 =-0.0007 (-0.51) 
 
R2=0.0266 
DW=2.0998 
Obs 4580 
α=0.0012 (0.08) 
α1 =1.0428 (3.57)* 
α2 =2.6563 (10.85)* 
α3 =-0.0149 (-3.17)* 
 
R2= 0.0482 
DW= 2.06 
Obs 2844 
α=0.0005 (0.0329) 
α1 =0.3377 (2.39)** 
α2 =0.4349 (9.11)* 
α3 =0.0007 (0.59) 
 
R2=0.0507 
DW= 2.26 
Obs 1736 
Deficits countries  
(Hungary, Latvia  
Romania) 
α=0.0003 (0.02) 
α1 =0.2653 (1.39) 
α2 =0.7807 (12.21)* 
α3 =0.0012 (0.90) 
 
R2=0.0430 
DW=1.9854 
Obs 3435 
α=0.0015 (0.07) 
α1 =0.9919 (2.75)* 
α2 =1.8876 (8.47)* 
α3 =-0.0111 (-2.25)** 
 
R2=0.0389 
DW=2.0225 
Obs 2133 
α=0.0004 (0.01) 
α1 =-0.0186 (-0.08) 
α2 =0.69 (10.10)* 
α3 =0.0022 (1.57) 
 
R2=0.0747 
DW=1.9593 
Obs 1302 
* - significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *** - significant at 10% 
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Table 2 Models in levels (equations 3 and 4) 
 
 Entire period  
06/2006:05/2010 
 
Prior to the crisis 
06/2006:09/2008 
Crisis period  
10/2008:05/2010 
Fixed exchange rate  
(Bulgaria, Estonia,  
Lithuania) 
α=-0.0005 (-0.19) 
 
α2 =0.8119 (25.29)* 
α3 =0.0007 (3.26)* 
α4 =0.0462 (2.04)** 
α5 =0.6247 (4.54)* 
 
R2= 0.1720 
DW= 2.0185 
Obs 3435 
α=0.0001 (-0.06) 
 
α2 =0.5294 (15.23)* 
α3 =-0.0004 (-0.71) 
α4 =0.0795 (3.72)* 
α5 =0.2466 (1.66)*** 
 
 
R2= 0.1063 
DW= 2.2964 
Obs 2133 
α=0.0102 (1.73)*** 
 
α2 =0.9847 (17.67)* 
α3 =0.0007 (2.35)** 
α4 =0.0069 (0.16) 
α5 =1.1345 (4.13)* 
 
 
R2=0.2120 
DW=1.9174 
Obs 1302 
Inflation targeting 
(Poland, Hungary,  
Czech Republic,  
Romania) 
α=0.006 (0.05) 
α1 =0.4199 (2.55)** 
α2 =0.5540 (10.26)* 
α3 =-0.0008 (-0.67) 
α4 =0.0814 (0.72) 
α5 =0.09 (0.13) 
 
R2=0.0251 
DW=2.0992 
Obs 4580 
α=-0.0059 (-0.36) 
α1 =0.8274 (2.48)** 
α2 =2.7048 (10.95)* 
α3 =-0.0150 (-3.12)* 
α4 =0.0152 (0.09) 
α5 =-0.7713 (-0.64) 
 
R2= 0.0463 
DW= 2.0609 
Obs 2844 
α=0.0040 (0.21) 
α1 =0.2277 (1.37) 
α2 =0.4380 (9.21)* 
α3 =0.0003 (0.30) 
α4 =0.1841 (1.36) 
α5 =0.4040 (0.47) 
 
R2=0.0502 
DW= 2.2632 
Obs 1736 
Deficits countries  
(Hungary, Latvia  
Romania) 
α=0.0011 (0.06) 
α1 =0.0932 (0.43) 
α2 =0.7859 (12.37)* 
α3 =0.0009 (0.65) 
α4 = -0.3857 (-2.28)**
α5 =1.1740 (1.14) 
 
R2=0.0449 
DW=1.9819 
Obs 3435 
α=-0.0062 (-0.27) 
α1 =0.7669 (1.92)*** 
α2 =1.9204 (8.61)* 
α3 =-0.0109 (-2.17)**
α4 =-0.1148 (0.48) 
α5 =0.2834 (0.17) 
 
R2=0.0382 
DW=2.0221 
Obs 2133 
α=0.0120 (0.37) 
α1 =-0.1792 (-0.70) 
α2 =0.6943 (10.30)* 
α3 =0.0016 (1.19) 
α4 =-0.6320 (-2.64)*
α5 =1.9381 (1.27) 
 
R2=0.0817 
DW=1.9532 
Obs 1302 
* - significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *** - significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion of the results and concluding remarks 
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According to the results we can observe that inflation targeting and pegged exchange 
rate NMS demonstrate significant differences in terms of monetary integration and the 
perception of fiscal risk. Overnight interest rate spread under fixed exchange rate in normal 
times depends on monetary factors mainly on expectations about future behavior of interest 
rates and an assessment of the liquidity situation presented by the three-month spread. In the 
same period for inflation targeting countries some role plays the spread in policy rates and 
CDS. The relationship between policy rate and overnight has the expected positive sign. The 
relationship with CDS is negative, which at first glance does not confirm the theoretical 
assumption of the link between the monetary and fiscal risk. In fact the pre-crisis period is 
characterized by a cycle of rising interest rates by the ECB, accompanied by plenty of 
liquidity for countries with inflation targeting. And when the tries to tighten monetary policy 
were observed, this is not the case in respect of the fiscal efforts. There were budget deficits 
regardless of the upward phase of the cycle. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is not always reflected 
by an adequate change of the CDS spread due to high economic growth and the 
underestimation of the inherent risks. Therefore, both risks - monetary and fiscal move 
together.  
Some of the NMS are characterized by high volatility in its monetary variables, high 
budget deficits, and vulnerability to shocks that force them to seek assistance from IMF and 
EU. Due to similarities in their behavior we separated them into the third group called “deficit 
countries”. Before the crisis the behavior of spreads is similar to that of inflation targeting 
countries. Although with fixed exchange rate we decided to put Latvia here because of 
macroeconomic similarities with the deficit and low disciplined countries.  
The crisis has changed the relationship between liquidity and fiscal risks. Fiscal risks 
approximated by the CDS spreads are statistically significant in the group of fixed NMS, 
which mean that higher fiscal risk leads to further rise of the liquidity risks, i.e. short term 
interest rates. However, for inflation targeting countries CDS spreads are insignificant, as is 
could be observed also on the chart 3, when he remains at the lower levels than for fixed 
NMS. This is another illustration of the fact that the fixed exchange rates are perceived as 
riskier when using macro policy for coping with the external shocks. But such risk assessment 
finds no real confirmation in practice, since the countries with currency board are not turned 
to international institutions during the crisis, and moreover, Estonia was admitted to the 
eurozone (January, 2011) by satisfying the necessary Maastricht criteria. 
In terms of equations for overnight interest rates the expected relationships were 
confirmed. The hypotheses of greater degree of monetary integration with the euro before the 
crisis for the NMS with fixed exchange rate, and the importance of the proper monetary 
policy for countries with inflation targeting regime were supported. Deficits countries have 
the same behavior as inflation targeting. The crisis leads to disconnect between overnight 
interest rates in NMS and euro area, however the impact of euro area monetary variables is 
observed mainly through the expectations of future interest rate behavior, represented by the 
three months interest rates. The importance of external perception of fiscal risks increases and 
CDS were statistically significant with the expected sign. The crisis leads to a strong 
reduction of the impact of its own monetary policy on overnight interest rates for inflation 
targeting and deficits countries and became statistically insignificant. Concerning deficits 
countries the overnight interest rates moves in the opposite direction from that of the Eonia. 
In conclusion we can say that the results obtained form the high frequency panel data 
models support the theoretical hypotheses and policy intuition that exists strong relationship 
between the liquidity risk (measured by the short term money markets) and fiscal risk 
(measured by CDS) and that this link is extremely unstable during the financial crisis. The 
relative performance of different monetary regimes concerning the liquidity-fiscal risk 
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connection is debatable, and although the countries with currency boards is perceived as more 
vulnerable, the recent practice shows that they are more stable, and did not resorts to foreign 
financial assistance, at least for now.  
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